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ABSTRACT
Non-primary care physicians earn considerably more than primary care physicians in the United
States.  I examine a number of explanations for the persistent high rates of return to medical
specialization and conclude that barriers to entry may be creating an economic shortage of non-
primary care physicians.  I estimate that medical students would be willing to pay teaching
hospitals to obtain residency positions in dermatology, general surgery, orthopedic surgery, and
radiology rather than receiving the mean residents’ salary of $34,000.  In the simulation, the
quantity of residents in these four specialties would increase by an estimated six to 30 percent,
rates of return would fall substantially, and teaching hospitals would save an estimated $0.6 to
$1.0 billion per year in labor costs. 
Sean Nicholson







  Physicians who practice in the primary care specialties of general internal medicine, family 
practice, and pediatrics earn substantially less than physicians in non-primary care specialties.  If one 
controls for the one to two years of additional residency training required in non-primary relative to 
primary care specialties, there are still substantial rates of return to specialization.  In 1998, for example, 
the estimated rates of return to specializing in radiology, orthopedic surgery, general surgery, 
obstetrics/gynecology, and anesthesiology relative to entering family practice, exceeded 25 percent.
1  
These rates of return are considerably larger than empirical estimates of the real discount rate, which is 
about three percent (Gramlich, 1990).   
In theory these relatively high rates of return could be consistent with an equilibrium 
characterized by equalizing differences, variation in returns to ability by specialty, and/or liquidity 
constraints.  Although these supply-side factors may be relevant, they cannot fully explain the high rates 
of return to specialization, because throughout the 1990s there have consistently been more medical 
students seeking entry into specialties with high rates of return than there are residency positions 
available.  This implies that barriers to entry in the market for residents, a demand-side (for residents) 
factor, affect the realized supply and price of physician services, and help create rents for non-primary 
care physicians.  The normative perception among many policymakers and health service researchers, on 
the other hand, is that there are too many non-primary care physicians, or specialists, in the United States 
(Physician Payment Review Commission, 1995).  I propose in this paper that barriers to entry may be 
creating an economic shortage of non-primary care physicians.  This suggests that welfare could possibly 
                                                           
1 I describe the methodology for calculating the cross-section rates of return in Section II.    3
be improved if the number of non-primary care residency positions were allowed to increase, thereby 
increasing the supply of non-primary care physician services and reducing the price of those services.
2 
In Section II of this paper I estimate cross-section rates of return in six non-primary care 
specialties over the 1986-1998 time period using data from the American Medical Association’s (AMA) 
annual physician survey.  Although rates of return to specialization have fallen over time, they are still 
strikingly large.  In the third section of the paper I examine a number of explanations for the persistence 
of high rates of return to specialization related to the supply of medical students to residency programs in 
different specialties, and teaching hospitals’ demand for residents.   
I offer three explanations for why the market for residents fails to clear.  Residency Review 
Committees (RRCs), private organizations that consist primarily of physicians from a particular specialty, 
essentially have complete control over the number of residents who train in each specialty, and therefore 
control the flow of new physicians to a specialty.  Like utility-maximizing labor unions that negotiate 
with firms in order to maximize employment and rents (Pencavel, 1984; MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986), I 
show that RRCs could set the flow of residents in order to achieve their desired combination of licensed 
physicians and physician rents.  In 2002 a group of physicians filed a class action lawsuit against seven 
medical organizations, including the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), 
which oversees the 26 different RRCs.  The lawsuit contends that the ACGME has created anti-
competitive standards that restrict medical students’ access to residency programs (Jung, 2002).
3   
I also offer two more benign explanations why the market for residents may not clear.  The 
ACGME historically has required that teaching hospitals pay residents a reasonable wage and pay 
residents in all specialties the same amount.  However, the wage that clears the market for residents in 
                                                           
2 The welfare implications of removing the barriers to entry are ambiguous if physicians induce demand for their 
services in response to an increase in the supply of physician services.  McGuire (2000) examines the theoretical 
and empirical aspects of physician-induced demand.     4
pediatrics or family practice may be too high to clear the market for surgical residents.  Finally, the 
market for residents may fail to clear if there is insufficient clinical raw material (patients) to train the 
number of non-primary care physicians who seek entry into these specialties and hospitals are unable to 
increase patient supply.  I show that these later two explanations -- minimum wage regulation and scarcity 
of teaching material -- could have the same effect as conscious rent-seeking behavior by RRCs.   
In the fourth section of the paper I simulate the set of residents’ wages that would allow the 
market for residents to clear, and examine the implications of market clearing on the quantity of residents 
in each specialty, the rates of return to specialization, and teaching hospitals’ labor expenses.  I estimate 
that medical students would be willing to pay teaching hospitals for residency training in dermatology, 
general surgery, orthopedic surgery, and radiology.  Since teaching hospitals currently pay residents about 
$34,000 per year, on average, this would result in $0.6 to $1.0 billion in annual savings for teaching 
hospitals, depending on the supply and demand parameters used in the simulation.  Furthermore, the 
quantity of residents would increase by an estimated six to 30 percent, and the rates of return would fall 
substantially in these four specialties, toward empirical estimates of the real discount rate. 
 
II. Rates of Return to Medical Specialization  
Consider a medical student who graduates from medical school in year t=0 and expects to work 
for T years.  Her expected present value of lifetime earnings in primary care (specialty j), which requires 
three years of residency training, will be:  
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3 The lawsuit also claims that these seven organizations and teaching hospitals exchange information in the National 
Resident Matching Program in order to pay residents lower wages and require more hours worked than would occur 
in a competitive labor market, and the Match itself removes students’ ability to negotiate wages.   5
where r is the discount rate, w
res
jt is a resident’s salary in specialty j in year t, and yjt is the expected 
earnings from practicing medicine in specialty j in year t.  A similar expression could be written for the 
expected present value of lifetime income in non-primary care (specialty k), which requires four or five 
years of residency training.  The rate of return to the incremental training in specialty k, relative to 
specialty j, is the discount rate rk that equates the expected net present values in the two specialties.  That 
is, rk solves the following equation: 
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If students’ earnings expectations are rational, one could measure the expected rate of return to 
specialization using a panel data set that contains the mean income that a cohort of physicians actually 
received throughout their careers.  To analyze changes in expected rates of return over time, one would 
need panel data sets for successive cohorts of students.  Panel data sets for even a single cohort of 
students are rare, and these data sets usually span only a small portion of a medical career.  I adopt the 
more practical empirical strategy of estimating rates of return using repeated cross-section data sets that 
contain the earnings of physicians with different experience levels at a point in time.  If students expect 
the contemporaneous experience-earnings profile of practicing physicians to remain constant in real terms 
in the future, the cross-section rate of return will be an accurate representation of medical students’ 
expected returns to specialization.
4 
In order to calculate returns to specialization, one needs to establish a reference specialty that 
requires a minimum amount of training.  I use family practice as the reference, benchmark specialty 
because it involves a relatively short residency period, is chosen by a large number of medical students, 
and the clinical training is general in nature.  Eleven percent of U.S. medical students who entered the 
                                                           
4 Nicholson and Souleles (2002) examine the determinants of medical students’ subjective income expectations.  
Although students do condition their expectations on contemporaneous physician income in the specialty they plan 
to enter, they find that students also anticipate, to some extent, subsequent changes in specialty income.   6
2001 National Residency Matching Program (“the Match”) received a position in family practice.  
Although internal medicine was a more popular specialty (25 percent of U.S. medical students), many of 
these individuals will eventually practice in an internal medicine sub-specialty such as cardiology or 
gastroenterology.  Burstein and Cromwell (1985) define general practitioners as the baseline specialty, 
and Marder and Willke (1991) define the baseline specialty to be physicians with one or two years of 
years of experience who are not board certified and are practicing in a primary care specialty.
5  Although 
most states allow physicians with at least one year of residency training to obtain a license, almost all 
physicians receive at least three years of residency training.  In the 1998 Community Tracking Study 
Physician Survey, for example, only 3.9 percent of physicians received fewer than three years of 
residency training.   
  Self-reported data on physician earnings and hours worked are available from the American 
Medical Association’s (AMA) Socioeconomic Monitoring System (SMS) survey for 1986 to 1998.  Each 
year the AMA surveys about 4,000 practicing physicians who are nationally representative by specialty, 
experience, board certification status, and membership in the AMA.
6  The AMA reports the mean income 
from medical practice, after medical expenses but before taxes, by specialty for the following age groups: 
physicians under 36 years old, between 36 and 45, between 46 and 55, between 56 and 65, and over 65 
years old.  I make a number of assumptions in order to estimate the cross-section age-income profile for 
specialty in each year.  First, I assume that the mean practice income for an age category corresponds to 
physicians at the midpoint of each age range.  For example, the mean income of a 50-year old pediatrician 
is set equal to the reported mean income of pediatricians between 46 and 55 years of age.  Second, I 
linearly interpolate between age-specific observations.  Third, prospective physicians are assumed to 
                                                           
5 Most general practice residency programs were converted into family practice residency programs, with the 
changes beginning in the 1970s.   
6 The AMA publishes summary data from the Socioeconomic Monitoring Study surveys in the Physician 
Socioeconomic Characteristics publication.  Each year the AMA surveys about 4,000 full-time, practicing   7
graduate from medical school when they are 26 years old, spend the number of years as a resident that is 
required for board certification, begin practicing medicine immediately after completing residency 
training, and retire when they are 65 years old.
7  The mean number of hours that physicians work per year 
ranged in 1997 from 2,300 in radiology to 3,100 in obstetrics/gynecology.
8  I perform a Laspareyes-type 
adjustment to account for differences in work effort.  Specifically, the mean income in specialty k (Yk) is 
multiplied by (Hj/Hk) to standardize leisure at the observed level in the benchmark specialty (specialty j).
9   
  The discounted present values of lifetime earnings between 1986 and 1998 are presented in Table 
1 for nine specialties.
10  I assume the real discount rate is three percent and I convert the earnings to 1998 
dollars using the urban consumer price index.  In 1986 the net present value of lifetime income ranged 
from $2.6 million in family practice, pediatrics, and general internal medicine to $5.7 million in 
orthopedic surgery.  Physician lifetime income increased in real terms in all specialties between 1986 and 
1992, and increased more substantially in the non-primary than primary care specialties (second to last 
column of Table 1).  The net present value of lifetime income fell by at least seven percent in every non-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
physicians based on a nationally representative sample from the AMA Masterfile, which is a census of all 
physicians (whether or not they are members of the AMA).  
7 Data on the average residents’ salary is available from surveys conducted by the Association of American Medical 
Colleges.  I assume that the residents’ salary does not differ across specialties, which is almost always the case 
within a teaching hospital and is very nearly true in national data.  The number of years of residency training 
required in each specialty is taken from the Graduate Medical Education Directory, 1996-1997.   
8 I derive the mean hours worker per year in a specialty by multiplying the mean number of weeks worked per year 
by the mean number of hours worked in a typical week, as reported in the AMA surveys.   
9 Lindsay  (1973) demonstrates that a Laspareyes-type adjustment may over or understate the rate of return to 
specialty training.  However, if an investment in training in specialty j is worthwhile with a Laspareyes-type 
adjustment, it will always be worthwhile.   
10 The AMA reports combined data on earnings by age group for general internists and internal medicine sub-
specialists, and combined earnings data for general surgeons and surgical sub-specialists.  These two groupings 
include specialties that require different amounts of residency training.  For example, cardiologists, 
gastroenterologists, and general internists are all included in the internal medicine category although they require 
different amounts of residency training.  The AMA does report the mean earnings of general internists and general 
surgeons (without any sub-specialists includes), but not mean earnings by age group for these two specialties.  To 
estimate the age-specific mean earnings of general internists, I multiply the ratio of the general internist to overall 
internal medicine (including sub-specialists) mean earnings by the age-group mean earnings for all internal 
medicine physicians.  I assume, therefore, that the age-earnings profile of general internists has the same shape as 
the combined internal medicine physicians, but is shifted up or down.  The same method is used to derive the age-
group mean earnings for general surgeons.     8
primary specialty between 1992 and 1998.  The incomes of family practitioners and general internists 
continued to increase in real terms during this time period, although the increases were modest.  If the 
age-earnings profile remains constant in the future, medical students who entered radiology and 
orthopedic surgery in 1998 will earn almost $6 million during their careers, almost twice as much as 
students entering family practice, general internal medicine, and pediatrics. 
  I report rates of return to specialization in Table 2.  In every year between 1986 and 1998 there 
was a positive return to an investment in specialized training, where family practice represents the 
benchmark specialty with only three years of residency training.  The rates of return are strikingly large, 
especially between 1986 and 1992, and have persisted for a longer time period than could be explained by 
the lag between an income shock and an increase in the supply of newly trained physicians.  The rates of 
return in anesthesiology and radiology, specialties that require only one additional year of training 
relative to family practice, often exceeded 100 percent.  The rates of return in orthopedic and general 
surgery, specialties that require two extra years of training, were greater than 38 percent.  Cross-section 
rates of return have fallen in all specialties since 1992 but still greatly exceed the empirical estimates of 
the real discount rate (Gramlich, 1990).    
  Investments in specialty training appear to have become more lucrative over the last two decades.  
Using income data from 1967 to 1980, Burstein and Cromwell (1985) estimate a cross-section rate of 
return for obstetricians/gynecologists and general surgeons of between 10 percent and 15 percent.  Marder 
and Willke (1991) also estimate large cross-section rates of return to training in the non-primary care 
specialties using data from 1987: radiology (47 percent), anesthesiology (40 percent), ob/gyn (26 
percent), psychiatry (24 percent), and general surgery (22 percent).  These rates of return are smaller than 
the ones I estimate for 1986, probably because their benchmark specialty consists of primary care 
practitioners with fewer than three years of residency training, whereas my benchmark is dominated by 
board-certified family practitioners with three years of residency training.      9
 
III.  Explanations for Persistently High Rates of Return to Specialization 
  I now examine reasons why the rates of return to specialization presented in Table 2 are so high.  
If medical students have the same preferences, ability, discount rates, and there are no liquidity 
constraints and barriers to entering specialties, the rate of return in each specialty should be equal to the 
discount rate (Willis, 1986).  If any of these assumptions does not hold, the rate of return to specialty 
training could vary across specialties and differ from the discount rate.   
I begin by examining four explanations why the rates of return to specialization might be so large 
that all relate to the supply of medical students to specialties: equalizing differences, heterogeneous 
ability, liquidity constraints, and the nature of medical students’ income expectations.  I then examine 
three explanations that relate to the demand for residents: restrictions on the number of residents due to 
cartel behavior, scarcity of teaching material, and restrictions on the residents’ wage imposed by a private, 
accrediting organization. 
  When medical students choose a specialty they clearly care about more than just income and 
leisure.  In a 1992 survey, medical students were asked to identify specialty attributes that had a strong or 
major influence on their specialty decision.  The attributes receiving the largest number of affirmative 
responses were the intellectual content of the specialty (61 percent), the existence of challenging 
diagnostic problems (60 percent), and the degree of emphasis on people skills (39 percent).  Only seven 
percent of the students indicated that the relative income of the specialty had a strong or major influence 
on their choice.  Predictable working hours, prestige, and the presence of research opportunities were all 
considered to be more important than income.   
  When preferences for non-monetary attributes are heterogeneous, the compensating differential 
of the marginal student — the student exactly indifferent between family practice and an alternative 
specialty -- will determine the rate of return for that specialty.  The larger is the compensating differential   10
of a particular specialty relative to family practice, the higher will be the rate of return to that specialty 
because students will require “extra” compensation in order to enter.  Large rates of return to 
specialization will exist if medical students believe that non-primary care specialties have relatively 
undesirable non-monetary attributes, such as inflexible work schedules or a higher incidence of 
malpractice suits.   
  A second possible explanation for large rates of return to specialization is the presence of 
liquidity constraints.  A medical student who wants to maximize his lifetime income and smooth 
consumption over his lifetime might decide to forego a non-primary care specialty with a high rate of 
return for a primary care specialty if he is unable to borrow sufficient funds while a resident.  If this 
occurs on a wide scale, non-primary physicians’ incomes will be driven up.  Smoothing consumption 
becomes more challenging when residents have substantial debt payments.  The mean amount of debt 
among U.S. medical school graduates in 2001 was $82,000, up from $45,000 in 1992.
11 
  A third possible explanation for high rates of return to specialization is that there are returns to 
ability in medicine, and these returns are particularly large in non-primary care specialties.  In such a 
scenario, high-ability students would self-select into non-primary care specialties and low-ability students 
would become primary care physicians.  When estimating cross-section rates of return, I assume 
implicitly that the returns to ability do not differ across specialties.  If the returns to ability are higher in 
non-primary than primary care, the observed mean income of family practitioners would understate what 
a high-ability student would expect to earn in primary care, and I would estimate too high a rate of return 
to specialization.   
  Bhattacharya (2000) estimates a model where a student’s choice of specialty and her specialty-
specific income are endogenous.  A student’s debt and age at the completion of medical school are 
assumed to affect her specialty choice but not her income conditional on the choice of specialty.  Using 
                                                           
11  Data on indebtedness is from the AAMC Medical School Graduation Questionnaire.   11
data from 1990, Bhattacharya estimates the income that physicians in specialty A would make if they had 
chosen specialty B instead, and compares this estimated income with the actual incomes of physicians 
practicing in specialty B.  Although he finds evidence that students who select non-primary care 
specialties would earn more as primary care physicians than primary care physicians actually earn, the 
annual wage premiums are usually less than five percent.  If Bhattacharya’s result from 1990 can be 
generalized, self-selection on the basis of ability does not appear to be the primary explanation for high 
rates of return to specialty training.
12   
  A final supply-side explanation is that the cross-section rate of return calculation assumes that 
medical students have static income expectations; they expect the contemporaneous age-earnings profile 
in each specialty to remain constant in real terms.  If students have forward-looking income expectations, 
then medical students’ expected returns from training might diverge sharply from the cross-section rates 
of return.  For example, although practicing radiologists and anesthesiologists are currently receiving 
large incomes, medical students might believe that managed care, technological changes such as digitized 
radiology, and the increased supply of nurse anesthetists will drive down physician incomes in these 
specialties in the future.  In this case, the expected rate of return that is influencing students’ specialty 
choices might be substantially lower than the 83 percent (radiology) and 47 percent (anesthesiology) 
figures reported in Table 2.  Nicholson and Souleles (2002) find evidence that medical students do, to 
some extent, incorporate future trends in specialty income into their own income expectations. 
  If students consider ability, debt, and equalizing differences when selecting the specialty that 
maximizes utility, and if a large number of students choose primary care as a result, then rates of return to 
specialization could certainly vary across specialties and exceed the discount rate.   However, collectively 
these factors cannot fully explain the observed high rates of return.  If supply-side considerations were the 
                                                           
12 Nicholson and Souleles (2002) also find some evidence of selection according to ability; students who chose non-
primary care specialties expected to earn more in those specialties than students who actually chose primary care 
specialties.   12
sole cause of high rates of return, the supply of medical students to each specialty would equal the 
demand for residents in that specialty.  This is not the case; there is a persistent excess supply of residents 
to most specialties that have high rates of return, which indicates that medical are trying unsuccessfully to 
capture the perceived rents in non-primary care. 
  The method by which medical students choose residency positions offers a rare opportunity to 
separately observe the desired and realized supply of labor, and therefore to observe a market in 
disequilibrium.  More than 80 percent of the students who graduate from a U.S. medical school apply for 
a residency position through the National Resident Matching Program (“the Match”).  Each applicant 
ranks residency positions in the Match in descending order of his preference; each residency program 
ranks applicants in descending order of its preference; and a computer algorithm makes binding 
assignments.  Ratios of the supply of to the demand for residents between 1991 and 2002 are presented in 
Figure 1 for nine specialties.  The supply of residents to a specialty is defined as the number of applicants 
who rank a residency program from that specialty as their first choice in the Match; the demand for 
residents is defined as the number of first-year residency positions offered in the Match by teaching 
hospitals. 
  In 1991 there was an excess supply of residents in radiology, ob/gyn, and orthopedic surgery -- 
specialties with high rates of return according to Table 2 (column 3 and 4).  In dermatology, which began 
offering residency positions through the Match in 1997, there are almost twice as many applicants as 
positions available.  These ratios probably understate the imbalance between the number of students who 
want to get into specialties with high rates of return and those who are actually accepted.  Nicholson 
(2002) argues that there are costs of not receiving a position in the Match, so risk averse students with a 
relatively low probability of entering their desired specialty may choose an alternative as their first choice 
in the Match.  Due to the excess supply of residents, forty percent of the U.S. medical graduates who   13
ranked an orthopedic surgery program first in the Match did not receive an assignment in that specialty.
13  
The unmatched rates in radiology (23 percent) and ob/gyn (17 percent) were smaller but still substantial. 
According to Figure 1, specialties with relatively low earnings such as family practice, internal medicine, 
pediatrics, and psychiatry were experiencing an excess demand for residents.
14 
  Since disequilibrium in the market for residents may create an economic shortage of non-primary 
care physicians in the physician services market and create rents for non-primary care physicians, I now 
examine more closely how the market for residents functions.  In 2002, residency programs were offered 
in 26 different specialties by over 1,200 U.S. teaching hospitals.  Medical students must receive at least 
one year of residency training in order to practice medicine in the United States, and if a medical student 
wishes to become licensed to practice, he must attend an accredited residency program.  Therefore, the 
market for residents is an intermediate market that largely determines the number and distribution of 
physicians in the United States, much as law schools are an intermediate market for determining the 
number of lawyers.   
Consider a well functioning market for residents and physicians in the simple case where there is 
a single primary care (PC) and a single non-primary care (NPC) specialty.  Consumers’ aggregate demand 
for primary and non-primary care physician services is depicted in Panel B of Figure 2 as a downward 
function of the price of physicians’ services, or the physicians’ fee (PNPC and PPC).  Residents are an input 
into the production of hospital patient care and perhaps also an argument in the utility function of a non-
profit hospital.  Teaching hospitals’ aggregate demand for primary and non-primary care residents, 
depicted in Panel A of Figure 2, is negatively related to the residents’ wage (w
PC and w
NPC), as with all 
factors of production.  Conditional on the residents’ wage, the supply of physician services in a specialty 
(SNPC and SPC in Panel B) is an increasing function of the price of physicians’ services in that specialty 
                                                           
13 Data on match rates are from the NRMP (National Resident Matching Program) Data Book.   14
because more medical students will enter the specialty as expected lifetime earnings increase; conditional 




PC in Panel A) is an increasing 
function of the residents’ wage in a specialty for the same reason.
15   
The markets for residents and physicians are depicted in long-run equilibrium in Figure 2.  Each 
year teaching hospitals hire Q
r*
NPC non-primary care residents and Q
r*
PC primary care residents and pay 
them wages WNPC and WPC, respectively.  This flow of residents just offsets the number of physicians 





PC.  The residents’ wages and prices for physicians’ services are such that the marginal 
medical student is indifferent between the two specialties.  In this well-functioning market, non-primary 
and primary care residents may receive substantially different wages in equilibrium unless they are 
perfect substitutes in the hospital production function and the desired supply to the two specialties are 
identical.   
According to Figure 1, in many specialties with high rates of return the supply of residents 
exceeds teaching hospital’s demand for residents.  In a well-functioning labor market, medical students 
who wanted to enter orthopedic surgery, radiology, ob/gyn, and dermatology -- specialties with high rates 
of return relative to family practice and an excess supply of residents in the Match -- would bid down the 
residents’ wage in those specialties.  As the cost of hiring these residents falls, teaching hospitals would 
move down their demand curve and offer more residency positions in these specialties.  Over time, as 
more residents complete training in non-primary care specialties, the supply of non-primary care 
physician services in Panel B of Figure 2 would shift out, and the price of non-primary care physician 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 Although it had a high rate of return, anesthesiology also had an excess demand for residents.  As mentioned 
above, however, during this time period medical students probably expected future anesthesiology incomes to be 
below their contemporaneous levels due to the advent and growth of nurse anesthetists. 
15 In Figure 2 the supply curves are upward-sloping rather than perfectly elastic because I assume there are 
heterogeneous preferences among medical students for the non-monetary attributes of the two specialties; it will 
take a large increase in the primary care fee, for example, to induce a student who places a high value on the 
prestige associated with non-primary care to switch specialties.   15
services and the rate of return to non-primary care would fall as well.  Likewise, teaching hospitals would 
be expected to raise the residents’ wage when necessary to fill vacancies, such as occurred in pediatrics, 
family practice, and internal medicine in the early 1990s.   
I offer three possible explanations for why the market for residents does not clear.  One 
explanation is that the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), a private 
organization responsible for overseeing residency training, may purposefully limit residency positions in 
order to secure rents for practicing physicians.  The ACGME is sponsored by five organizations: the 
American Medical Association, the American Board of Medical Specialties Specialties (e.g., American 
Board of Dermatology), the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Hospital 
Association, and the Council of Medical Specialty Societies (e.g., American Academy of Dermatology) 
(Graduate Medical Education Directory, 1996).  The ACGME sets overall policies and allows a separate 
Residency Review Committee (RRC) to review and accredit residency programs in each of the 26 
specialties.  Each of the five sponsoring organizations appoints four representatives to an RRC and the 
government appoints one non-voting representative.   
A teaching hospital that wants to open a new residency program or increase the number of 
residents in an existing program must apply to the relevant RRC.
16  A RRC considers a number of factors 
when deciding whether to approve a program and how many residents may be trained at each program: 
“Those numbers (of residents who may be trained by a program) will be based primarily on the number, 
qualifications, and commitment of the faculty; the volume and variety of the patient population available 
for educational purposes; the quality of the educational offering; and the totality of the institutional 
resources” (Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, 1996).  The current approval process 
                                                           
16 The RRCs also periodically review established programs to ensure they are in compliance with the standards.  
Programs may be placed on probation and eventually closed if they do not address concerns of the RRC.  For 
example, the Thoracic Surgery RRC reviewed 43 vascular surgery programs in 1990 and 1991.  Twenty-six percent 
of the programs were cited for inadequacies in continuity of care, and 16 percent were cited for a lack of formal 
periodic evaluation of the residents (Barnes, 1993).     16
for residency positions has the appearance of a “fox guarding the chicken coop.”  A Residency Review 
Committee consists primarily of physicians from the same specialty, and its decisions affect the future 
supply of physicians and physician income in that specialty. 
A RRC essentially has complete control over the flow of physicians into a specialty because 
medical students who attend residency programs that are not certified by the ACGME are not eligible to 
take the licensing exam, and thus are not able to practice in the United States.  In this sense, a RRC has 
the same power as a labor union that is the sole source of a certain type of labor and negotiates 
collectively with a firm or set of firms.  Economists have modeled labor unions as maximizing a utility 
function whose arguments are the quantity of union members employed and either the workers’ rents or 
the total wage bill, subject to the firms’ labor demand (Pencavel, 1984; MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986).  
The union chooses the wage and firms respond by hiring a quantity of union workers such that the 
marginal product equals the wage.   
The relevant constraint for a RRC is consumers’ aggregate demand for physician services (DNPC 
in Figure 3 for the non-primary care RRC).  The RRC’s utility function is tangent to the demand curve at 
Point J.  Whereas a union chooses the wage and allows a firm to choose the profit-maximizing quantity of 
labor conditional on that wage, a RRC would choose the flow of residents (Q
r
NPC) that will in the long run 
produce the desired, utility-maximizing quantity of physician services (QNPC) and price of those services 
(PNPC).
17  In order to ensure that the optimal quantity of non-primary care services will be supplied, the 
RRC could place a cap of Q
r
NPC on the number of residency positions that could be approved.  In Panel A 
of Figure 3, the effective demand for non-primary care residents would be truncated at Q
r
NPC.  
                                                           
17 Although a residency review committee can control the number of physicians in a specialty, it cannot control the 
number of hours physicians work once they are licensed, and therefore cannot precisely determine the quantity of 
services supplied.   17
Whether a RRC’s imposition of restrictions on residency positions reduces welfare depends on 
whether physicians can induce demand for their services.
18  In Panel B of Figure 3, the shaded rectangle 
represents the rents that non-primary care physicians receive, where P*NPC is the price of physician 
services that would prevail if the market for residents cleared.
19  These rents represent a transfer from 
consumers to physicians and therefore do not represent a loss of social welfare.  At Point J there will not 
appear to be a shortage of non-primary care physician services because supply equals demand at the 
prevailing price PNPC.  However, if the RRC allowed the market for non-primary care residents to clear 
and physicians were not able to or were unwilling to affect the demand for their services, the price for 
non-primary care physician services would fall to P*NPC, and the quantity of services would increase.  
Therefore, the black triangle in Figure 3 would represent the loss in consumer surplus due to the 
restrictive behavior of the RRC.  The more elastic is the demand for physician services, the greater would 
be the welfare loss.  If physicians are able to induce demand for their services, on the other hand, then 




NPC may actually reduce welfare 
because the physicians would perform services whose costs exceed their benefit. 
If cartel behavior by RRCs explains the rents enjoyed by non-primary care physicians, then a 
logical question is why the primary care RRCs don’t further reduce the flow of residents to increase the 
income of primary care physicians closer to the levels experienced by non-primary care physicians.
20  
One explanation is that the demand for primary care services may be more elastic than for non-primary 
care services, so the rents available to a primary care RRC would be much lower than for a non-primary 
care RRC.  That is, a primary care RRC facing a flatter demand curve would choose a higher quantity of 
                                                           
18 See McGuire (2000) for an extensive review of the role of physicians as agents, and their ability to induce 
demand for their services. 
19 Kleiner (2000) finds that workers in professions that require licensing, such as dentists, earn rents relative to 
workers of comparable human capital.  
20 It is possible that primary care physicians are capturing rents relative to students who enter a non-medical 
occupation.  Weeks et al. (1994), however, find that primary care physicians experience lower rates of return to   18
physicians and lower rents than a non-primary care RRC facing a steep demand curve if the two 
committees have the same preferences.  It seems plausible that there are more substitute providers for 
primary than non-primary care, and therefore that the primary care demand curve will be relatively 
elastic.
21  A second explanation is that the primary care specialties are relatively populous, and it may be 
more difficult for a RRC representing a large constituency to restrict entry than one representing a small 
constituency.  There are between 50,000 (pediatrics) and $98,000 physicians (general internal medicine) 
in each of the three primary care specialties, whereas the non-primary care specialties displayed in Table 
1 have between 23,000 (orthopedic surgery) and 45,000 physicians (psychiatry).  A third explanation is 
that primary care RRCs may have different preferences; they may place a greater weight on the quantity 
of physicians in the specialty relative to the rents received than non-primary care RRCs. 
 There is a second, more benign possible explanation for why the market for residents does not 
clear.  In many procedural specialties, the RRCs have established a threshold for the minimum number of 
procedures that residents must complete during their training.
22  The RRC for Thoracic Surgery, for 
example, requires vascular surgery residents to perform at least 70 “major” cases (Barnes, 1993).  A 
teaching hospital applying to expand an existing residency program or open a new program must show 
that there is a sufficient volume and variety of patients such that residents will meet these thresholds.
23  A 
minimum volume threshold could have the same impact on the market for residents as cartel behavior.  In 
Figure 3, teaching hospitals’ demand for non-primary care residents would be truncated at Q
r
NPC if that is 
the maximum number of residents that can be trained given the existing quantity of non-primary care 
patients at teaching hospitals. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
educational training than students who receive a masters in business administration from a highly-ranked school and 
attorneys – people who arguably face the same occupational choice sets as medical students. 
21 Nurse practitioners and specialists, for example, can perform many of the functions of a primary care physician.  
22  According to personal correspondence with Dr. David Leach, Executive Director of the ACGME, in April 2001. 
23 Most RRCs do not report the volume thresholds to the public.    19
One benefit of licensing is that when there is asymmetric information about the product or 
service, such as exists between a patient and a physician, licensing assures the patient that the physician 
has been adequately trained and will provide services exceeding some minimum acceptable (to the 
licensing organization) quality (Leland, 1979).  It is possible, of course, that the minimum volume 
thresholds are a way of camouflaging cartel behavior.  However, a RRC could conceivably enhance rather 
than decrease social welfare if the marginal benefit of an additional case on a physician’s skill is large, 
and physicians would under invest in these skills without regulation because consumers cannot detect 
quality differences between physicians.  However, if non-primary care RRCs are restricting residency 
positions to ensure a competent labor force, why don’t teaching hospitals increase the number of patients 
available to residents?  This could be achieved by either rotating residents through multiple hospitals in 
the course of their training, which already occurs to some extent, or by centralizing scarce types of 
patients at a single facility.    
  A third possible explanation for why the market for residents does not clear is that the ACGME 
has established a minimum wage for residents and requires teaching hospitals to pay all residents the 
same wage, regardless of specialty.  Until recently, the ACGME had established the following policy 
related to residents’ salaries: “Financial support of residents is necessary to ensure that residents are able 
to fulfill the responsibilities of their educational programs.  All residents at similar levels of experience 
and training in all of an institution’s programs should receive a comparable level of financial support.  
Exceptions must be justified to the institution’s Graduate Medical Education Committee” (Accreditation 
Council of Graduate Medical Education, 1996).  Teaching hospitals have adhered to the ACGME’s 
policy.  The mean residents’ salary nationally was almost constant across specialties in 1992, ranging 
from $28,200 in family practice to $29,300 in radiology.  Anecdotal data and an analysis of a small 
sample of New England teaching hospitals indicates that almost all teaching hospitals paid residents the 
same salary, regardless of their specialty.     20
The Federal Trade Commission interpreted the ACGME’s policy on residents’ wages as a 
restraint of trade, so the ACGME recently added “adequate” to the beginning of the policy statement 
quoted above, and dropped the second and third sentences: “Adequate financial support of residents is 
necessary to ensure that residents are able to fulfill the responsibilities of their educational programs.”
24  
The principal objective of the current ACGME policy is to ensure that residents are paid enough so they 
will not feel compelled to take a second job, such as working a 24-hour shift in a hospital emergency 
room.
25  Moonlighting when a resident is already working 60 to 80 hours a week is perceive to endanger 
patients’ lives and/or reduce the quality of the residency training. 
The ACGME has not specified what the minimum wage is.  However, one could imagine that a 
teaching hospital seeking permission to open or expand a program would risk rejection by the RRC if it 
proposed to pay its residents substantially less than the prevailing mean wage.  The imposition of a 
minimum wage for residents could create abnormally high rates of return to specialization.  In Figure 3, 
say the minimum wage is set at W.  Q
r
NPC residents would be hired, the same number as under the cartel 
model and the situation with limited clinical “teaching material.”  Therefore, each of the three potential 
explanations for why the market for residents does not clear could result in the same number of realized, 
observed non-primary care residents, and thus the same number of non-primary care physicians.  Since it 
is difficult to distinguish empirically which of these three explanations is the principal cause of market 
failure, I focus in the next section on simulating the impact of allowing the market for residents to clear, 
without specifying the specific policy that would achieve this objective. 
 
IV. Simulating the Clearing of the Market for Residents  
In this section I estimate the set of specialty-specific residents’ wages that would equate the 
supply and demand of residents, and examine the implications of market clearing on the quantity of 
                                                           
24 http://www.acgme.org   21
residents in each specialty, the rates of return to specialization, and teaching hospitals’ labor expenses.  
Designing the policy that would allow the market to clear requires knowing what is preventing the market 
failure.  If RRCs were purposefully restricting residency positions to gain rents, the relevant policy would 
be the establishment of an objective, unbiased organization to approve residency programs.  If there is 
insufficient teaching material in certain specialties, then the implicit action behind the simulation is a 
centralization of scarce patient types at teaching hospitals.  If market failure is due primarily to the 
minimum residents’ wage, the relevant policy is the elimination of this rule. 
Panel A of Figure 3 depicts a specialty with an excess supply of residents.  Q
r
NPC residents are 
hired at wage W.  Q
M
NPC, the number of applicants who rank the specialty as their first choice in the 
Match, is also observed.  Let W
*
NPC be the wage that equates the supply of and demand for residents, and 
Q
r*
NPC the quantity of residents employed under such circumstances.  My goal is to estimate, for 




*r).  That is, I am trying to identify where the unrestricted supply and demand 
curves for residents intersect (Point K in Panel A of Figure 3).  I simulate a partial rather than a general 
equilibrium model, because I do not allow medical students’ income expectations to be affected by 
changes in the flow of residents, or medical students’ subjective expectation of entering a specialty to 
depend on the number of residency positions offered.       
If one knows the percentage change in the quantity of residents demanded associated with a one 
percent increase in the residents’ wage (0
d), and the percentage change in the quantity of medical students 
who wish to enter a specialty associated with a one percent increase in the residents salary in that 
specialty (0
s), then one can solve the following two equations for W* and Q* -- the wage and quantity of 
residents that would clear the market at Point K:  
(3)    Q* = Q
s (1 + η
s (W* - W)   ;  Q* = Q
d (1 + η
d (W* - W) ,    
           W          W 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25  According to personal correspondence with the Executive Director of the ACGME in April 2001.   22
 
where Q
s is the observed number of students who currently rank a specialty first in the Match (supply), Q
d 
is the observed number of residency positions offered in the Match (demand), and W is the prevailing 
residents’ salary, which is the same in both specialties. 
I use an estimate of 0
d (-0.08) from Nicholson and Song (2001).  This parameter is identified by 
cross-sectional variation (across hospitals) in the change in the price of residents caused by a revision in 
1986 of the government subsidization of residents.
26  The dependent variable in this analysis was the 
change in the number of residents hired by a teaching hospital between 1986 and 1991.  One reason 
teaching hospitals may be unresponsive to changes in the price of residents is that they are constrained, 
either by residency review committees or by the lack of patients, in how many positions they can offer.  If 
there were constraints on the demand for residents during this time period, the –0.08 demand elasticity 
would be biased toward zero; if teaching hospitals had been unconstrained when the policy altered the 
financial incentives to hire residents, they would have responded more aggressively to the change.  Based 
on aggregate data, the barriers to entry were weaker between 1986 and 1991 than they are now.  In the 
1986-1991 period, for example, there was an average of 110 fewer residency positions available in the 
Match per year than there were applicants, whereas in the 1997-2002 period, there was an average of 
4,800 fewer positions available per year than applicants. Nevertheless, in the simulation I also examine a 
scenario where the demand elasticity is twice as large in absolute value (-0.16) as that estimated in 
Nicholson and Song (2001).    
  Since I am simulating the residents’ wage that will clear the market for residents, ideally I would 
like 0
s to be an estimate of how responsive medical students’ specialty choices are to the residents’ wage.  
There is, as mentioned above, little cross-sectional variation in the residents’ wage between specialties, so 
it is difficult empirically to measure such an elasticity.  Therefore, I estimate 0
s as the responsiveness of 
                                                           
26 In 1986 Medicare made indirect medical education payments less generous and allowed teaching hospitals in 
Massachusetts and New York to receive these payments.   23
medical students to the mean income of a practicing physician in a specialty, and then convert this 
estimate into a comparable measure in terms of the residents’ wage.
27  Specifically, I estimate the 
following regression equation using ordinary least squares: 
 (4)  log(Q
s
j,t)  =  β 0 + β 1Specialtyj + β 2log(Yj,t-1) + ε j,t , 
where Q
s is the number of Match applicants who rank specialty j as their first choice in year t.  Q
s is the 
number of students who desire to enter a specialty rather than the number who successfully enter a 
specialty, and should therefore be a reasonably good measure of the supply of residents if there were no 
constraints on the number of positions available.  The above equation is estimated using aggregated data 
on all Match applicants from 1986 and 1991-1999 for 12 specialties.
28  Mean physician income in 
specialty j (Yj,t-1) is lagged one year because most surveys of physician income, including the AMA 
survey data that are used here, are published and available to medical students one year after the survey is 
conducted.
29     
Specialty indicator variables are included in equation (4), so the coefficient β 2 is identified by 
variation over time within a specialty in the mean income of practicing physicians.  It is evident from 
Figure 4 that during the 1990s there was substantial variation between specialties in the growth rate of 
physician income.  When the contemporaneous mean income rises in a specialty that already has an 
excess supply of residents, the rents associated with the specialty will increase, but the probability of 
                                                           
27 I use the mean income of a specialty rather than the cross-section net present value of lifetime income because 
age-specific income data are not available in dermatology and emergency medicine.  β2 (in equation 4) measures the 
percentage change in the number of medical students who rank a specialty first in the Match in response to a one 
percent increase in the mean income of physicians in that specialty.  In order to simulate residents’ wages that will 
clear the market for residents, I want to know how medical students’ specialty choices respond to changes in the 
residents’ wage rather than the change in the mean income of practicing physicians.  A general surgeon will practice 
for about 30 years but serve as a resident for only five years.  Using general surgery as a representative non-primary 
care specialty, a one percent increase in the annual income of a practicing physician has the same cumulative impact 
on a surgeon’s present value of lifetime earnings as a 27 percent increase in the annual salary of a resident.
   In the 
simulation, therefore, I divide β2 by 27 when analyzing how a change in the residents’ wage affects specialty 
choices.  
28  Data on the number of Match applicants who rank a specialty first were not available for 1987-1990. 
29 Income is adjusted for differences in hours worked between specialties using a Laspareyes-type adjustment based 
on hours worked by family practitioners.   24
entering the specialty will remain less than one.  Since there are costs associated with failing to receive an 
assignment in the Match (Nicholson, 2002), the increased rents may convince fewer students to rank the 
specialty first in the Match than if there were no barriers to entry.  In a specialty that is not demand-
constrained, on the other hand, an increase in contemporaneous income may overstate the change in 
students’ expected lifetime income if students forecast that the supply of physicians in that specialty will 
increase, which will eventually drive down the price of physician services.
30  Since β 2 may be biased 
downward, in the simulation I include a scenario where the supply elasticity is 50 percent larger than the 
elasticity derived with β 2. 
  I estimate equation (4) separately for U.S. and international medical school graduates (IMGs) 
because these groups may respond differently to income variation between specialties.  I use the β 2 
coefficient estimate from the U.S. medical school regression in the simulation below.  I include year 
indicator variables in the IMG regression because immigration policy may affect the total number of non-
U.S. citizens allowed to enter the Match.   
Results from the specialty choice regression are presented in Table 3.  The coefficient on income 
in the U.S. medical school graduate regression (column 1) is positive and significant.  A one percent 
increase in a specialty’s contemporaneous income is associated with a 1.35 percent increase in the number 
of U.S. medical school graduates who rank that specialty as their first choice in the Match.
31  The 
coefficient on income is also positive in the international medical graduate (IMG) specification but is not 
significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level.  The monotonically increasing coefficients on the 
year dummies in the IMG regression indicate that the total number of foreign-trained physicians entering 
the U.S. for residency training increased throughout the 1990s.   
                                                           
30 Siow (1984) presents a model where only a single cohort of lawyers expect to receive rents following a shock to 
expected income because future cohorts will arbitrage away the rents. 
31 This supply elasticity is similar to the 1.42 estimated by Nicholson (2002).  Using a cross-sectional data set of 
medical students who graduated in 1992, he accounts for entry barriers by allowing a student’s expected lifetime 
earnings in a specialty to depend on his likelihood of entering the specialty.     25
In Table 4 I present the simulation results for the wage that would clear the market for residents 
in four specialties where there is currently an excess supply of residents.  In most specialties in the 2001 
Match there were more U.S. and international students who ranked a specialty as their first choice than 
there were positions available in that specialty.  For purposes of the simulation, I adopt a more 
conservative definition of a specialty that has an excess supply of residents: a specialty where the number 
of U.S. medical school graduates (international medical graduates are omitted) who rank that specialty 
first in the Match exceeds the number of available positions.  U.S. medical students are generally 
perceived by residency programs to be better qualified than students trained internationally, as evidenced 
by the much higher acceptance rate of U.S. students relative to IMGs in the Match.
32  If teaching hospitals 
have a minimum quality threshold for residents, the effective supply of residents will be less than the 
observed supply.  Four specialties were experiencing excess supply in the 2001 Match according to this 
stricter definition: dermatology, general surgery, radiology, and orthopedic surgery. 
The first column of Table 4 reports the number of residency positions offered in the 2001 Match 
(Q
d).  The excess supply of residents is reported in the second column, where “excess supply” is defined 
as the number of U.S. medical students who ranked a specialty first in the Match but did not receive a 
position in that specialty in the Match.  This is an underestimate of the true excess supply because some 
international students who did not receive a position in the Match would be hired by teaching hospitals at 
some wage, and the figure is an overestimate because some of the U.S. students who rank the specialty 
first would not be hired by teaching hospitals regardless of the wage.   
The top panel of Table 4 presents results of the simulation using the -0.08 elasticity of demand 
from Nicholson (2002) and the elasticity of supply estimated above (1.35), converted into an elasticity 
with respect to the residents’ wage rather than the mean income of a practicing physician.  As mentioned 
                                                           
32 In the 2001 Match, for example, 79 percent of U.S. medical school graduates who ranked orthopedic surgery as 
their first choice received a position in that specialty in the Match, versus 25 percent of the IMGs who ranked 
orthopedic surgery as their first choice (NRMP Data, 2001).   26
previously, in a market with no or fewer barriers to entry, teaching hospitals might be more price-
responsive than they have been in the past.  Therefore, in the bottom panel of Table 4 I report simulation 
results with an elasticity of demand for residents, which is twice as large in absolute value as in the top 
panel (-0.16) and an elasticity of supply that is about 50 percent larger than that of Table 3 (2.0). 
Using the relatively inelastic elasticity parameters (Scenario I), teaching hospitals are predicted to 
receive an annual payment of $95,000 from dermatology residents rather than paying them $34,000 per 
year, as is currently the case.  The quantity of first-year dermatology residents is predicted to increase 
from 252 to 328, or by 30 percent.  The new residents’ wage is predicted to reduce the rate of return to the 
incremental year of dermatology training (relative to family practice) from 47 percent to 12 percent, a 
figure that is much closer to empirical estimates of the discount rate.  If the increased supply of 
dermatologists eventually lowers the price of dermatology services, the new expected rate of return to 
dermatology would fall even further. 
The equilibrium residents’ wage in general surgery, radiology, and orthopedics are likewise 
predicted to be negative, but not as large in absolute value as for dermatology.  The number of first-year 
residents hired in these three specialties is predicted to increase by 8 percent, 16 percent, and 10 percent, 
respectively, and the rates of return to training fall below 24 percent in all three specialties.  One 
implication of removing the barriers to entering residency programs is that teaching hospitals are 
predicted to reduce their net wage payments to residents by $1.0 billion per year if the lower wages were 
fully phased-in to residents of all experience levels (not just first-year residents) in the affected 
specialties. 
In the bottom panel of Table 4 I simulate the residents’ wage that clears the market when teaching 
hospitals and prospective residents are more responsive to price changes.  In Scenario II, the equilibrium 
quantity of residents in each of the four specialties is larger and the equilibrium residents’ wage is smaller 
than in the first simulation.  Dermatology residents, for example, are predicted to pay hospitals $40,000   27
per year, and the quantity of dermatology residents is predicted to increase by 35 percent.  Teaching 
hospitals would be predicted to spend $572 million less on resident salaries, and rates of return in all four 
specialties would be below 32 percent. 
 
Conclusion 
Medical students have experienced persistently large rates of return to specialization.  These 
relatively high rates of return could be due, in part, to equalizing differences, variation in returns to ability 
by specialty, and liquidity constraints.  However, these factors cannot fully explain the high rates of 
return to specialization because throughout the 1990s there have consistently been more medical students 
seeking entry into specialties with high rates of return than there are positions available.  This implies that 
barriers to entry in the market for residents may affect the realized supply and price of physicians services 
and help create rents to non-primary care specialists.   
I examine a number of explanations for persistent high rates of return to medical specialization 
and conclude that barriers to entry may be creating an economic shortage of non-primary care physicians.  
I estimate that medical students would be willing to pay teaching hospitals for residency training in 
dermatology, general surgery, orthopedic surgery, and radiology rather than receiving the average 
residents’ salary of $34,000.  When I simulate the residents’ wage that clears the market, the quantity of 
residents in these four specialties is predicted to increase by an estimated six to 30 percent, rates of return 
would fall substantially, and teaching hospitals would save an estimated $0.6 to $1.0 billion per year.   
   28
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Table 3 
 
Coefficient Estimates of the Supply of Medical Students to Specialties 
 
                             International  
     Variable          US Medical Students      Medical Graduates 
 
Log(mean physician income t-1)     1.35**       0.960 
      ($000)    (0.309)     (0.700) 
 
Year indicator variables (1991 omitted) 
-  1992           0.141 
(0.124)  
-  1993           0.317** 
(0.127) 
-  1994           0.460** 
          (0.127) 
-  1995           0.531** 
(0.126) 
-  1996           0.633** 
(0.125) 
-  1997           0.752** 
(0.122) 
-  1998           0.780** 
(0.122) 
-  1999           0.878** 
(0.124) 
Constant       0.916       1.45 
     ( 1 . 5 2 )      ( 3 . 4 4 )  
 
Observations     113         102 
 
Adjusted R
2     0.92         0.90 
 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the log(number of applicants to the Match who rank a specialty first) for 
1986 and 1991-1999.  Data on international medical graduates are not available for 1986.  Indicator 
variables are included for each of the 12 specialties.  
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